# 1NC

## off

#### There is no reason to vote affirmative—there is no connection between the recommendations of the 1AC and material agency.

**Schlag ‘90** (Pierre, professor of law at the University of Colorado, Stanford Law Review, lexis, AM)

In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not **the slightest chance** that you might actually be in a position to do it. For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [\*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future**, we should.** . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all **practical purposes,** its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students -- persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.

#### Using the USFG is violent imperialism---vote negative to shatter the illusion that we are policy-makers

Reid-Brinkley ‘8 (Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, University of Pittsburgh Department of Communications, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” 2008)

So, within public discourse, how race is coded rhetorically in public deliberation is of critical import.

Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original).116 118 The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policy-oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same.

#### This is a question of priorities---their reliance on the state actively promotes racist domestic warfare and the prison industrial complex---prefer the alt which allows for more creative, dynamic forms of activism AGAINST THE STATE---the pedagogical nature of the activity matters

Rodriguez 8 (Dylan, Associate Professor at Un iversity of Califo r n i a Riverside, Warfare and the Terms of Engagement, libcom.org/files/Critical Resistance - Abolition Now! Ten Years of Strategy and Struggle against the Prison Industrial Complex.pdf

This introductory litany of dread reminds us that domestic warfare is both the common language and intensely materialized modality of the US state. While this form of legitimated state violence certainly predates Reagan's "war on drugs" and his/its inheritors, the scope and depth of domestic warmaking seems to be mount­ ing with a peculiar urgency in our historical moment. To take former NYPD and current LAPD Chief William Bratton on the strength of his own words, the pri­ mary work of the police is to engage aggressively in "the internal war on terrorism," which in these times entails everything from record-breaking expansions of urban police forces, to cross-party consensus in legislating state offensives against crimi- 92 nalized populations o f choice, and the reshuffling of administrative relationships between the militarized and juridical arms of local and federal government to fa­ cilitate the state's various localized "wars on gangs." It is in this context that we can urgently assume the political burden of critically assessing the work of progressive US based community and non-profit organizations, grassroots movements, and is­ sue-based campaigns: that is, if we are to take the state's own language of domestic warfare seriously, what do we make of the political, ideological, institutional, and financial relationships that progressive movements, campaigns, and organizations are creating in (uneasy) alliance with the state's vast architectures of war? Under what conditions and sets of assumptions are progressive activists, organizers, and scholars able to so militantly oppose the proliferation of American state violence in other parts of the world, while tolerating the everyday state violence of US policing, criminal law, and low-intensity genocide?

We are collectively witnessing, surviving, and working in a time of unprec­ edented state-organized human capture and state-produced physical/social/ psychic alienation, from the 2.5 million imprisoned by the domestic and global US prison industrial complex to the profound forms of informal apartheid and proto­ apartheid that are being instantiated in cities, suburbs, and rural areas all over the country. This condition presents a profound crisis-and political possibility-for people struggling against the white supremacist state, which continues to institution­ alize the social liquidation and physical evisceration of Black, brown, and aboriginal peoples nearby and far away. If we are to approach racism, neoliberalism, mili­ tarism/militarization, and US state hegemony and domination in a legitimately "global" way, it is nothing short of unconscionable to expend significant politi­ cal energy protesting American wars elsewhere (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) when there are overlapping, and no less profoundly oppressive, declarations of and mobilizations for war in our very own, most intimate and nearby geographies of "home."

This time of crisis and emergency necessitates a critical examination of the po­ litical and institutional logics that structure so much of the US progressive left, and particularly the "establishment" left that is tethered (for better and worse) to the non-profit industrial complex (NPIC). I have defined the NPIC elsewhere as the set of symbiotic relationships that link political and financial technologies of state and owning class social control with surveillance over public political discourse, including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social movements. This definition is most focused on the industrialized incorporation, accelerated since the 1970s, of pro-state liberal and progressive campaigns and movements into a spec­ trum of government-proctored non-profit organizations. It i s i n the context o f the formation o f the NPIC a s a political power structure that I wish to address, with a less-than-subtle sense of alarm, a peculiar and dis­ turbing politics of assumption that often structures, disciplines, and actively shapes the work of even the most progressive movements and organizations within the US establishment left (of which I too am a part, for better and worse): that is, the left's willingness to fundamentally tolerate-and accompanying unwillingness to abolish-the institutionalized dehumanization of the contemporary policing and imprisonment apparatus in its most localized, unremarkable, and hence "normal" manifestations within the domestic "homeland" of the Homeland Security state. Behind the din of progressive and liberal reformist struggles over public policy, civil liberties, and law, and beneath the infrequent mobilizations of activity to defend against the next onslaught of racist, classist, ageist, and misogynist crimi­ nalization, there is an unspoken politics of assumption that takes for granted the mystified permanence of domestic warfare as a constant production of targeted and massive suffering, guided by the logic of Black, brown, and indigenous subjection to the expediencies and essential violence of the American (global) nation-building proj ect. To put it differently: despite the unprecedented forms of imprisonment, so­ cial and political repression, and violent policing that compose the mosaic of our historical time, the establishment left (within and perhaps beyond the US) does not care to envision, much less politically prioritize, the abolition of US domestic warfare and its structuring white supremacist social logic as its most urgent task of the present and future. Our non-profit left, in particular, seems content to en­ bdgt ill Jesperate (and usually well-intentioned) attempts to manage the casualties of domestic warfare, foregoing the urgency of an abolitionist praxis that openly, critically, and radically addresses the moral, cultural, and political premises of these wars.

Not long from now, generations will emerge from the organic accumulation of rage, suffering, social alienation, and (we hope) politically principled rebellion against this living apocalypse and pose to us some rudimentary questions of radical accountability: How were we able to accommodate, and even culturally and politi­ cally normalize the strategic, explicit, and openly racist technologies of state violence that effectively socially neutralized and frequently liquidated entire nearby populations of our people, given that ours are the very same populations that have historically struggled to survive and overthrow such "classical" structures of domi­ nance as colonialism, frontier conquest, racial slavery, and other genocides? In a somewhat more intimate sense, how could we live with ourselves in this domestic state of emergency, and why did we seem to generally forfeit the creative possibilities of radically challenging, dislodging, and transforming the ideological and institutional premises o f this condition o f domestic warfare i n favor o f short-term, "winnable" policy reforms? (For example, why did we choose to formulate and tol­ erate a "progressive" political language that reinforced dominant racist notions of "criminality" in the process of trying to discredit the legal basis of "Three Strikes" laws?) What were the fundamental concerns of our progressive organizations and movements during this time, and were they willing to comprehend and galvanize an effective, or even viable opposition to the white supremacist state's terms of en­ gagement (that is, warfare)? This radical accountability reflects a variation on anti­ colonial liberation theorist Frantz Fanon's memorable statement to his own peers, comrades, and nemeses:

Each generation must discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it, in relative opac­ ity. In the underdeveloped countries preceding generations have simultaneously resisted the insidious agenda of colonialism and paved the way for the emergence of the current struggles. Now that we are in the heat of combat, we must shed the habit of decrying the efforts of our forefathers or feigning incomprehension at their silence or passiveness.

Lest we fall victim to a certain political nostalgia that is often induced by such illuminating Fanonist exhortations, we ought to clarify the premises of the social "mission" that our generation of US based progressive organizing has undertaken. In the vicinity of the constantly retrenching social welfare apparatuses of the US state, much of the most urgent and immediate work of community-based or­ ganizing has revolved around service provision. Importantly, this pragmatic focus also builds a certain progressive ethic of voluntarism that constructs the model ac­ tivist as a variation on older liberal notions of the "good citizen." Following Fanon, the question is whether and how this mission ought to be fulfilled or betrayed. I believe that to respond to this political problem requires an analysis and conceptu­ alization of "the state" that is far more complex and laborious than we usually allow in our ordinary rush of obligations to build campaigns, organize communities, and write grant proposals. In fact, I think one pragmatic step toward an abolitionist politics involves the development of grassroots pedagogies (such as reading groups, in-home workshops, inter-organization and inter-movement critical dialogues) that will compel us to teach ourselves about the different ways that the state works in the context of domestic warfare, so that we no longer treat it simplistically. We require, in other words, a scholarly activist framework to understand that the state can and must be radically confronted on multiple fronts by an abolition ist politics.

In so many ways, the US progressive/left establishment is filling the void created by what Ruthie Gilmore has called the violent "abandonments" of the state, which forfeits and implodes its own social welfare capacities (which were already insuf­ ficient at best) while transforming and (productively) exploding its domestic war­ making functionalities (guided by a " frightening willingness to engage in human sacrifice"). Yet, at the same time that the state has been openly galvanizing itself to declare and wage violent struggle against strategically targeted local populations, the establishment left remains relatively unwilling and therefore institutionally un­ able to address the questions of social survival, grassroots mobilization, radical so­ cial justice, and social transformation on the concrete and everyday terms of the very domestic wares) that the state has so openly and repeatedly declared as the premises of its own coherence.

P I T FA L L S O F T H E P E DAG O G I CA L STATE

We can broadly understand that "the state" is in many ways a conceptual term that refers to a mind-boggling array of geographic, political, and institutional relations of power and domination. It is, in that sense, a term of abstraction: certainly the state is "real," but it is so massive and institutionally stretched that it simply can­ not be understood and "seen" in its totality. The way we come to comprehend the state's realness-or differently put, the way the state makes itself comprehensible, intelligible, and materially identifiable to ordinary people-is through its own self­ narrations and institutional mobilizations.

Consider the narrative and institutional dimensions of the "war on drugs," for nample. New Y ork City mayor Edward Koch, in a gesture of masculine challenge to the Reagan-era Feds, offers a prime example of such a narration in a 1986 op-ed piece published on the widely-read pages of The New York Times: I propose the following steps as a coordinated Federal response to [the war on drugs]: Use the full resources of the military for drug interdiction. The Posse Comitatus doctrine, which restricts participation of the military in civilian law enforce­ ment, must be modified so that the military can be used for narcotics control . . . Enact a Federal death penalty for drug wholesalers. Life sentences, harsh fines, forfeitures of assets, billions spent on education and therapy all have failed to deter the drug wholesaler. The death penalty would. Capital punishment is an extraordinary remedy, but we are facing an extraordinary peril . . . Designate United States narcotics prisons. The Bureau of Prisons should des­ ignate separate facilities for drug offenders. Segregating such prisoners from others, preferably i n remote locations such a s the Yukon or desert areas, might motivate drug offenders to abandon their trade. Enhance the Federal agencies combating the drug problem. The Attorney Gen­ eral should greatly increase the number of drug enforcement agents in New York and other cities. He should direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation to devote substantial manpower against the cocaine trade and should see to it that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is capable of detecting and deporting aliens convicted of drug crimes in far better numbers than it now does. Enact the state and local narcotics control assistance act of 1986. This bill provides $750 million annually for five years to assist state and local jurisdictions increase their capacities for enforcement, corrections, education and prosecution.

These proposals offer no certainty for success in the fight against drugs, of course. If we are to succeed, however, it is essential that we persuade the Federal Government to recognize its responsibility to lead the way. Edward Koch's manifesto reflects an important dimension of the broader in­ stitutional, cultural, and political activities that build the state as a mechanism of self-legitimating violence: the state (here momentarily manifest in the person of the New York City Mayor) constantly tells stories about itself, facilitated by a politi­ cally willing and accomplice corporate media.

This storytelling-which through repetition and saturation assembles the pop­ ular "common sense" of domestic warfare-is inseparable from the on-the-ground shifting, rearranging, and recommitting of resources and institutional power that we witness in the everyday mobilizations of a state waging intense, localized, mili­ tarized struggle against its declared internal enemies. Consider, for example, how pronouncements like those of Koch, Reagan, and Bratton seem to always be ac­ companied by the operational innovation of different varieties of covert ops, urban guerilla war, and counterintelligence warfare that specifically emerge through the state's declared domestic wars on crime/drugs/gangs/etc. Hence, it is no coincidence that Mayor Koch's editorial makes the stunning appeal to withdraw ("modify") the Posse Comitatus principle, to allow the Federal government's formal mobilization of its global war apparatus for battle in the homeland neighborhoods of the war on drugs. To reference our example even more closely, we can begin to see how the ramped-up policing and massive imprisonment of Black and Latino youth in Koch's 1980s New York were enabled and normalized by his and others' attempts to story tell the legal empowerment and cultural valorization of the police, such that the nuts-and-bolts operation of the prison industrial complex was lubricated by the multiple moral parables of domestic warfare.

This process of producing the state as an active, tangible, and identifiable structure of power and dominance, through the work of self-narration and con­ crete mobilizations of institutional capacity, is what some scholars call "statecraft." Generally, the state materializes and becomes comprehensible to us through these definitive moments of crafting: that is, we come to identify the state as a series of active political and institutional projects. So, if the state's self-narration inundates us with depictions of its policing and juridical arms as the righteously punitive and justifiably violent front lines of an overlapping series of comprehensive, militarized, and culturally valorized domestic wars-for my generation, the "war on drugs," the generation prior, the "war on crime," and the current generation, localized "wars on gangs" and their planetary rearticulation in the "war on terror"-then it is the ma­ terial processes of war, from the writing of public policy to the hyper-weaponiza­ tion of the police, that commonly represents the existence of the state as we come to normally "know" it.

Given that domestic warfare composes both the common narrative language and concrete material production of the state, the question remains as to why the establishment left has not confronted this statecraft with the degree of absolute emergency that the condition implies (war!). Perhaps it is because we are under­ estimating the skill and reach of the state as a pedagogical (teaching) apparatus, replete with room for contradiction and relatively sanctioned spaces for " dissent" and counter-state organizing. Italian political prisoner Antonio Gramsci's thoughts on the formation of the contemporary pedagogical state are instructive here: The State does have and request consent, but it also "educates" this consent, by means of the political and syndical associations; these, however, are private organisms, left to the private initiative of the ruling class.

Although Gramsci was writing these words in the early 1900s, he had already iden­ tified the institutional symbiosis that would eventually produce the non-profit in­ dustrial complex. The historical record of the last three decades shows that liberal foundations such as the Ford, Mellon, Rockefeller, Soros and other financial entities have become politically central to "the private initiative of the ruling class" and have in fact funded a breath-taking number of organizations, grassroots campaigns, and progressive political interests. The questions I wish to insert here, however, are whether the financially enabling gestures of foundations also 1) exert a politically disciplinary or repressive force on contemporary social movements and community based organizations, while 2) nurturing an ideological and structural allegiance to the state that preempts a more creative, radical, abolitionist politics.

Several social movement scholars have argued that the "channeling mecha­ nisms" of the non-profit industrial complex "may now far outweigh the effect of direct social control by states in explaining the . . . orthodox tactics, and moderate goals of much collective action in modern America." The non-profit apparatus and its symbiotic relationship to the state amount to a sophisticated technology of po­ litical repression and social control, accompanying and facilitating the ideological and institutional mobilizations of a domestic war waging state. Avowedly pro­ gressive, radical, leftist, and even some misnamed "revolutionary" groups find it opportune to assimilate into this state-sanctioned organizational paradigm, as it simultaneously allows them to establish a relatively stable financial and operational infrastructure while avoiding the transience, messiness, and possible legal compli­ cation of working under decentralized, informal, or even "underground" auspices. Thus, the aforementioned authors suggest that the emergence of the state-proc­ tored non-profit industry "suggests a historical movement away from direct, crud­ er forms [of state repression], toward more subtle forms of state social control of social movements."

The regularity with which progressive organizations immediately forfeit the crucial political and conceptual possibilities of abolishing domestic warfare is a direct reflection of the extent to which domestic war has been fashioned into the everyday, "normal" reality of the state. By extension, the non-profit industrial complex, which is fundamentally guided by the logic of being state-sanctioned (and often state-funded), also reflects this common reality: the operative assumptions of domestic warfare are taken for granted because they form and inform the popu­ lar consensus.

Effectively contradicting, decentering, and transforming the popular consensus (for example, destabiliZing assertive assumptions common to progressive move­ ments and organizations such as "we have to control/get rid of gangs," "we need prisons," or "we want better police") is, in this context, dangerously difficult work. Although, the truth of the matter is that the establishment US left, in ways both spoken and presumed, may actually agree with the political, moral, and ideological premises of domestic warfare. Leaders as well as rank-and-file members in avowedly progressive organizations can and must reflect on how they might actually be supporting and reproducing existing forms of racism, white supremacy, state violence, and domestic warfare in the process of throwing their resources behind what they perceive as "winnable victories," in the lexicon of venerable community organizer Saul Alinsky. Our historical moment suggests the need for a principled political rupturing of existing techniques and strategies that fetishize and fixate on the negotiation, massaging, and management of the worst outcomes of domestic warfare. One po­ litical move long overdue is toward grassroots pedagogies of radical dis-identification with the state, in the trajectory of an anti-nationalism or anti-patriotism, that reorients a progressive identification with the creative possibilities of insurgency (this is to consider "insurgency" as a politics that pushes beyond the defensive ma­ neuvering of "resistance"). Reading a few a few lines down from our first invoking of Fanon's call to collective, liberatory action is clarifying here: "For us who are de­ termined to break the back of colonialism, our historic mission is to authorize every revolt, every desperate act, and every attack aborted or drowned in blood." While there are rare groups in existence that offer this kind of nourishing polit­ ical space (from the L.A.-based Youth Justice Coalition to the national organization INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence), they are often forced to expend far too much energy challenging both the parochialisms of the hegemonic non-profit apparatus and the sometimes narrow politics of the progressive US left.

I have become somewhat obsessed with amplifying the need for a dramatic, even spectacular political shift that pushes against and reaches beyond the implicit pro­ state politics of left progressivism. Most importantly, I am convinced that the aboli­ tion ot domestic warfare, not unlike precedent (and ongoing) struggles to abolish colonialism, slavery, and programmatic genocide, necessitates a rigorous theoreti­ cal and pragmatic approach to a counter- and anti-state radicalism that attempts to fracture the foundations of the existing US social form-because after all, there is truly nothing to be redeemed of a society produced through such terror-inspiring structures of dominance. lhis political shift requires a sustained labor of radical vision, and in the most crucial ways is actually anchored to "progressive" notions of life, freedom, community, and collective/personal security (including safety from racist policing/criminalization and the most localized brutalities of neoliberal or global capitalism).

Arguably, it is precisely the creative and pragmatic work of political fantasy/ political vision/political imagination that is the most underdeveloped dimension of the US establishment left's organizational modus operandi and public discourse. While a full discussion is best left for another essay, we might consider the post- 1960s history of the reactionary, neoconservative, and Christian fundamentalist US right, which has fully and eagerly engaged in these political labors of fantasy/vi-sionlimagination, and has seen the desires of their wildest dreams met o r exceeded in their struggles for political and cultural hegemony. It might be useful to begin by thinking of ourselves as existing in a relationship of deep historical obligation to the long and recent, faraway and nearby historical legacies of radical, revolutionary, and liberationist struggles that have made the abolition of oppressive violence their most immediate and fundamental political desire.

## off

#### Economic engagement works with state institutions – the plan is civil society engagement

**Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k** - \*Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf>

Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic aid.3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.

#### Violation – aff does non-governmental engagement – [ ]

#### Vote negative to preserve predictable limits – allowing non-governmental engagements ensures thousands of random private actors get brought into the topic – explodes negative research burden

## off

#### Obama has won the Iran sanctions fight for now—opposition is still working to exploit on-the-fence Dems

Greg Sargent, WaPo, 1/22/14, Another blow to the Iran sanctions bill, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2014/01/22/another-blow-to-the-iran-sanctions-bill/

Add two more prominent Senators to the list of lawmakers who oppose a vote on an Iran sanctions bill right now: Patty Murray and Elizabeth Warren.

Murray’s opposition — which she declared in a letter to constituents that was sent my way by a source — is significant, because she is a member of the Senate Dem leadership, which is now clearly split on how to proceed. While Chuck Schumer favors the Iran sanctions bill, Murray, Harry Reid and (reportedly) Dick Durbin now oppose it. T**his could make it less likely that it** ever **gets a vote.**

From Murray’s letter: Please know that I share your concerns about the Iranian government’s nuclear program. Like you, I am troubled by Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and their desire to enrich nuclear materials above levels required for energy production. That is why I was pleased to see Iran take measurable steps toward addressing the international community’s concerns by signing the Joint Plan of Action last fall…While I still remain concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, I believe this agreement could be an important step in our efforts to reach a diplomatic solution to this complicated issue. I believe the Administration should be given time to negotiate a strong verifiable comprehensive agreement. However, if Iran does not agree to a comprehensive agreement that is acceptable, or if Iran does not abide by the terms of the interim agreement, I will work with my colleagues to swiftly enact sanctions in order to increase pressure on the Iranian regime. This hits some of the key points: The mere possibility of a long term deal is worth trying for, and sanctions can always be imposed later if the talks go awry. Meanwhile, Elizabeth Warren is circulating a letter to constituents out there that also opposes a vote. Asked about the letter, Warren spokesperson Lacey Rose emails me: “Senator Warren believes we must exhaust every effort to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomacy, and she does not support imposing additional sanctions through new legislation while diplomatic efforts to achieve a long-term agreement are ongoing.” Warren’s pull with the Democratic base, of course, is largely rooted in her emphasis on economic issues, but there has been some chatter in liberal circles inquiring about her stance on Iran. Since a mobilized left is important in preventing a vote that could derail diplomacy, her opposition can only help.

The method by which both Senators declared their positions — letters to constituents, in response to questions perhaps stoked by pressure from outside groups — says something about the caution Dems are demonstrating when it comes to the domestic politics of engagement with Iran. Those who favored a vote were far more vocal at first — as of now, 16 Dem Senators have signed on. But the continued silence of many Dem Senators signaled a broad unwillingness to join the bill, even as many were unwilling to publicly declare this to be the case, since Dems apparently see allowing negotiations to proceed, without getting a chance to vote in favor of getting tougher on Iran, as a politically difficult position to take.

If current conditions remain, **a vote is starting to look less and less likely**. Right now, the bill has 58 co-sponsors. On the other side, 10 Dem Senate committee chairs have signed a letter opposing a vote. Around half a dozen Dem Senators subsequently came out against it. With Murray and Warren, the number of Dems against a vote has comfortably surpassed the number who want one.

Meanwhile, announcements like the one earlier this month indicating that the deal with Iran is moving forward make a vote still less likely. With Murray now opposed, that means virtually the whole Dem leadership is a No. On the other hand, **those who adamantly want a vote** — insisting it would only help the White House and make success more likely, despite what the White House itself wants – **will be looking for any hook they can find to reactivate pressure**.

**And it’s worth stressing that if this ever did come to a vote, it’s quite possible that many of the Dems still remaining silent could still vote Yes**. Those Democrats would be putting themselves in a ridiculous, untenable position if they did that, but since many appear convinced that the alternative is politically worse, it remains a very real possibility.

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive despite supporters

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### Specifically, the plan’s development assistance costs capital

OECD 9 (ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Managing for Development Results, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/42447575.pdf>, March 2009) \*\*MfDR is Managing for Development Results\*\*

No two countries implement MfDR in exactly the same way. While changes in planning and budgeting processes are the most common and logical entry points for improving the approach, some countries have begun with changes in monitoring and evaluation of programmes, changes in civil service procedures, or changes in project planning and selection. Each of these actions, properly conceived and executed, can yield tangible results and support a cycle of performance improvement. Launching a serious MfDR process usually requires committed leaders with extensive credibility and a willingness to spend political capital to reform entrenched systems and improve government performance. The 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, which examines progress on aid effectiveness, found that the proportion of countries with “largely developed results-oriented frameworks” was a modest 5%. However, 56% of countries reported having taken some action since 2005. Experience suggests that fully institutionalising the approach takes a minimum of seven years. In most countries, this means that the process spans at least one political transition, and much of that time is taken up with important but relatively unglamorous efforts to change core systems and assemble a valid empirical basis for decisions. For this reason, it is essential to develop constituencies inside and outside of government and to ensure that the process is not seen as partisan or donor driven. N

#### Causes Israel strikes

Jon Perr 12/24/13**,** B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University; technology marketing consultant based in Portland, Oregon, has long been active in Democratic politics and public policy as an organizer and advisor in California and Massachusetts. His past roles include field staffer for Gary Hart for President (1984), organizer of Silicon Valley tech executives backing President Clinton's call for national education standards (1997), recruiter of tech executives for Al Gore's and John Kerry's presidential campaigns, and co-coordinator of MassTech for Robert Reich (2002).(Jon, “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran” Daily Kos, [http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran#](http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran)

As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran.¶ On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates:¶ If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence.¶ Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July:¶ "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb."¶ Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come."¶ But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway.¶ Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza.¶ That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback?¶ Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.

#### Great power war

Rafael Reuveny 10, PhD, Professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, "Unilateral Strike on Iran could trigger world Depression", Op-ed distributed through McClatchy Newspaper Co, <http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking_out/reuveny_on_unilateral_strike_Iran.shtml>

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash. For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground. All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians, but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or even numerous strikes — could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. A regional war Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981**,** Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony. Replaying Nixon’s nightmare Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario. Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted. If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force.

¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

## off

#### The aff’s call to fix a world gone astray is part of debate’s fixation on the suffering of the Other – this perspective is one of prescriptive colonialism that leads to endless violence

Jayan Nayar 12, law prof at the University of Warwick, The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-the-World: Thinking Exteriority, December 15, <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10978-012-9115-8/fulltext.html>

People suffer.17 This is a simple truth that takes little effort to state. Neither does the analysis of structures, of processes, of histories, of suffering require any accountable engagement on our part with suffering bodies (save perhaps in our field-work phase of enquiry as we seek data), nor with any of the vectors of violence whose complex intersections in historical time give material, embodied content to what we, in distance, name ‘suffering’. Put differently, the suffering condition when appropriated for the purposes of theory possesses no experiential meaning. Whilst lip service is paid to ‘voices of suffering’, voices as such are absented of experiential truth or ontological-political significance in any objectification of suffering as condition; voices are retained instead (perhaps, again, through the inclusion of some choice quotes of wretchedness, accumulated as data from the field) as theory’s justificatory launch-pads for intervention. At no point, for most of us theorists, is the suffering voice the voice of theory. Indeed, as Spivak (1988) so trenchantly affirmed, the ‘subaltern cannot speak’!18 The politics of discoursing suffering therefore is a politics **of the theorist**, suffering a problem to be solved by the theorist, where prescription is divorced from experience, theory from the relationality of violence and its local, day-to-day, normal and norm-alised infliction. At best, those that suffer, are invited to await the trickle-down of whatever benign ‘solution’ theory may purport to offer, post its lengthy journeys through intellectual and policy interrogations, as suffering is validated (or otherwise), its structural causation identified (or otherwise), its alleviation interrogated for many a disputed appropriateness of response (or otherwise).19 Having served the purpose of instigating theory, suffering itself becomes secondary to the politics of the ‘theorist/philosopher’—the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other—**of imperial recognition**, response and intervention.20 Thus rationalised solutions are offered to the problem of the suffering condition, as if some ideal may indeed be redeemed and made ‘real’ from the incomplete actual of the present, laying as it were, immanent, latent, awaiting (re)discovery. The theorist becomes the technician, the expert wielder of knowledge and strategic wisdom, to overcome the problem of suffering that is perceived as one of inadequate social cognition, institutional organisation and planning. Thus, for example, suffering, as human rights violation becomes the result of inadequate understanding of rights-scope and obligations (Craven 2007; Alston and Quinn 1987), or of the conceptual essence of rights itself, or of the allocation of resources.21 Or, to refer to another example of theory-talk (where the legacy of Levinas is apparent), suffering as global injustice becomes a problem of reformulating political affinities within the new meta-game of globalisation as methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck 2005),22 towards ‘global citizenship’ to overcome the limits of anachronistic notions of political identities and responsibilities (Dower and Williams 2002), of ‘social connection models’ (Young 2006); or of the ‘ethics of assistance’ (Chatterjee 2004) or of cosmopolitan care, responsibility, and the politics of redistribution and institutional reform (Pogge 2008). In these examples of discoursing suffering, thinking suffering and its alleviation, true to the ‘problem of the passage’ in Levinasian thought (Wolcher 2003),23 becomes rational work, and the technocratic, even bureaucratic, measuring of suffering and its (appropriate) responses becomes the practical implication of theory; the constant fluctuations of betrayals and aspirations, always with some justification close at hand, only serving to entrench further the Levinasian injunction to responsibility—for further endeavours of thinking-hope, to serve further the cause of salvation for the lost souls of ‘strangers’, as Wheeler (2000) so poignantly put it. Suffering, as condition, as commodity to be exploited, as depoliticised category rather than experience, as a technical/bureaucratic/managerial problem to be solved, remains therefore the ever-present alibi for legitimate interventions amidst constant (and inevitable) disappointments. A corrupt, violent, imperial, global order(ing) of social relations becomes also the saviour, constantly revitalised and called unto renewed being, with every call for the alleviation of suffering (Douzinas 2007b).24 For all the repeated urgings for the expansion of its boundaries, to repair the various denials of exteriority, totality, it seems, is little affected.25 How, therefore, do we account for the constant supply of suffering (through the cruelties of the world) that continues to move the demand for suffering-based thinking (despite these cruelties)? How might the apparent inconsequentiality of so much humanisation in the pervasiveness of inhumanity demand our critical self-reflection as we engage in the politics of hope? We make a huge assumption—we, who theorise alleviatory possibilities out of the suffering condition—that our faith systems are true to the promises proclaimed. With this assumption, we attempt to think our way out of (continuing) betrayals to enable the realisation of promises in which we wish to believe. Good promises they seemingly are: the promise to eliminate poverty; to end starvation; to realise education for all; the list goes on. We ask the question: what prevents the realisation of these promises? What might enable the realisation of these promises? How many more resources? What kind of political institutions? Perhaps to assuage our faith in the consequentiality of our thoughts, so many questions are followed by so many ‘should’-assertions that crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity—that the world community should respond to suffering; should expend the necessary (miniscule) resources that would alleviate chronic deprivation; should redress prevailing inequalities and injustices within the global economic order; should prioritise human rights in world trade and economic relations; should enforce legal regimes to hold transnational corporations responsible; should reform and democratise international institutions. The list, again, goes on, as do, notwithstanding all of these manifold ‘shoulds’, the ways of the world in which betrayals remain the normalities of business-as-usual (Robinson and Tormey 2009). Andrew Linklater’s contemplations on the prospects for ‘cosmopolitan obligations’ for ‘distant suffering’ is characteristic of the intellectual idealism of much theorisings of Humanity’s hopeful futures: the gulf between human societies may not be so difficult to bridge. … The obstacles to substantial progress have been well documented, and they will continue to shape the tracks along which globalization travels. But it is not beyond the ingenuity of the human race to rise above increasingly problematical particularistic moralities, and to create global arrangements that have the primary task of implementing cosmopolitan obligations to reduce distant suffering. (Linklater 2007, p. 33) As if the failures thus far have been simply due to a lack of ingenuity of the ‘human race’! What if, instead, the world order of inflicted suffering (and ‘the gulf between human societies’), the order of global impoverishment and insecurities, persists not merely as the outcome of a failure of (humane) consciousness to be corrected by suffering-based ethical theorisations of human rights and global justice, but as the result of created, planned and effected imperialist design as it continuously seeks to reshape world orders for profit? To what extent do the many ethical urgings for global transformations actually encounter the geo-and bio-politics of global coloniality that is defined by the material desires, motivations and actions of globalising elites, for whom, as Bauman (2003, p. 20) tells us, visions of the good life are defined not by attachments (to the suffering Other) but by a ‘disengaged imagination’ that seeks no utopian mission.26 In the face of such actualities, what do we make of the useful suffering of the ethical Self who purports to think for the Other? Inconsequentiality is the least of the criticisms that may be made. Nandy’s observation is pertinent: ‘domination today is rarely justified through oracles, ritual superiority, or claims to birthrights; domination is now more frequently justified in terms of better acquaintance with universal knowledge and better access to universal modes of acquiring knowledge’ (Nandy 2007, p. 227). Theorisations of hope that gaze upon suffering and that purport to contemplate, manage and solve suffering, therefore, as knowing (and modes of knowing) the Other, help create masks of hegemony for the brutal faces of domination.27

#### Reject their hopeful politics in favor of a focus on the failure that produced suffering – the aff is a caricature of the obsession with success imageries – only the right to fail can rupture the cycle

O’Gorman and Werry ’12 (Roisin O'Gorman, Ph.d., Theater and Drama Studies @ University of Cork, Margaret Werry, Department of Theater, University of Minnesota, “On Failure (On Pedagogy): Editorial Introduction,” Performance Research: A Journal of the Performing Arts Volume 17, Issue 1, 2012)

What has upped the stakes in this absurd drama is the **cultural dominance of hope and success** in a neoliberal age, now the mandate, measure and mantra **of the corporatizing university**. We live in the depressive ruins of the university, an entity dedicated to the rabid pursuit of illusory success when any substantive mission that might give that success substance has long since been mortgaged to market values (see Readings 1996 and Werry and O'Gorman 2009). The fetishization of excellence and outcomes, the prevalence of ‘audit culture’ (Strathern 2000) and prevailing instrumentalism and vocationalism, all institutionalize, codify and restigmatize failure. Now the encompassing regime of the test **eclipses all other ways of understanding** and valuing schooling: through standardized testing, student evaluations and bureaucratic measures of school ‘performance’, the threat of failure is the defining condition under which we (not just students but also teachers and institutions) operate. In these contexts, accidental failure is perilous, and the strategic, emancipatory or experimental use of failure – however much it is still necessary – is freighted with risk, danger and difficulty. The right to fail (with all its promise of inclusiveness, generosity, freedom) can only be claimed at an **ever-mounting cost**. The pedagogy of public art – as recent literature on relational aesthetics and established Freirian and Boalian work on theatre for social change attests – also carries an ameliorative and developmental charge, yoking artistic ventures to teleological narratives of hope, aspiration and social transformation. And it is likewise entwined with legitimating institutions (such as the academy) wedded to success. In public art projects, failure is often disavowed and internalized, mired in blame and shame, and papered over in the next hopeful grant proposal. Yet clearly, most such projects fail most of the time; fail to democratize, raise visibility, transform understandings or experiences or even gain the understanding and support of those they claim to aid. And no wonder: performance is a weapon of the weak aimed at mighty fortresses. We balance impossibly titanic political hopes – conflict-resolution, community-building, antiracism – on the precarious foundation of an art premised on failure. Such marginal efforts are often lodged in **defensive postures**, continually having to justify their existence with missionary zeal: they become good at talking about goals and strategies, less good at dwelling on their often disappointing outcomes and what they reveal about the process by which people and things change, learn, revert, resist, stall and change again, or about the catastrophes and collapses that attend any attempt at true dialogue across social difference. What would it mean to legitimate the continued practice of public art not in spite of but because of its inevitable failure? Dwelling on and in failure, it follows, offers **not only a tool of critique** or a diagnostic of neo-liberal enterprise, but also a way to remodel the theoretical premises of activist work in our discipline, querying the trajectories and temporalities of change enacted in performance. Performance practice teaches us how to live with and as failures, **finding possibility in predicament** and embracing the vulnerability of moments of failure that may also be moments of profound discovery in which we remain open to what transpires, rather than measure it against our intentions. Failure focuses progressive hopes not on future transcendence but in the interstices of present quotidian struggle and in the alternatives and possibilities for ethical action – for thinking and feeling otherwise – which that struggle makes available to us. It stands against the imperialism of hope, generates a reflexive understanding of the inherently agonistic space of learning and change – a space in which aspirations, resistances, prejudices and passions constantly clash, feelings run high and stumbling and flailing are a productive inevitability.3 Performance attunes us to this. Such a recalibration of the political posture of the discipline demands new tools. To look squarely at failure, we need methods designed not to capture the fixities of representation or identity but to help us navigate the slippery, fugitive terrain of process and affect. We might look, for example, to the immanent materialists – such as Bergson and Whitehead, Deleuze or Connolly – ‘philosophers of becoming’ who challenge us to set our analytic sights on moments of openness and uncertainty (where time is not purposive or linear, events not causal). These moments of ‘fecund duration’, in which emergence of the unthought can occur, are often occasions of failure of the known, stable or systemically enduring, requiring a response to which old habits, ideas or rules are not adequate, and for which we as subjects are not adequately prepared. They are acute experiences of the limits of human mastery, exceeding conscious awareness. Failure, we suggest, inaugurates such moments. It is a kind of freedom for which performance is a kind of practice, in which you ‘dwell creatively in uncertain situations’ (Connolly 2008). Uncertainty, of course, is a painful state to inhabit. Failure hurts. Failure haunts. It comes laced with shame, anger, despair, abjection, guilt, frustration – affects we usually wish away or hide. Thinking with failure means making affect an object of our curiosity rather than knowledge's irrelevant remainder. We need to slow failure's ‘ugly feelings’ down (Ngai 2005), ask them: ‘What are you doing here?’ Performance-sensitive work by theorists such as Berlant (2011, 2008), Tincineto Clough (2007), Ahmed (2004), Sedgwick (2003), Halberstam (2011) or Probyn (2005) has exposed the normative or coercive role that positive affect has often played in socio-political processes and worked to recuperate negative feelings as the site of emergence of alternative communities and alternative political imaginaries. (The role of shame in the solidarity of queer communities is a significant example.) Turning too swiftly away from the abyssal affect of failure risks capitulating **to its isolating, freezing effects**; **dwelling on it**, by contrast, allows us to imagine that **failure's misery can be,** **perversely, what unites us**. It allows us to imagine ourselves as members of response-able communities: individuals in a state of openness to moving and being moved by others. As Judith Halberstam has succinctly phrased it: ‘Failure loves company’ (2007: 89). Failure's timely challenge inspired our contributors to address a range of questions. How and why can performance be understood to have failed? What is the analytic power of failure to reveal the limits of the (currently) possible? How does it map what is thinkable, acceptable, appropriate, normal, desirable? What is the quality of failure as an aesthetic and as an affective experience? To what extent might that experience also be a political one? What are the pedagogical benefits of theorizing and practising failure? Can failure help us to shift the entrenched equation of power, knowledge and authority that structures schooling? What is the relationship between failure and change? How does failure prompt us to rethink the progressive transformation imagined by performance? What are the risks of valorizing failure in the way these questions imply? What does such a project stand to learn from those who are set up to fail, doomed to fail or dismissed as failures? We yoke movements for change, or the desire for a more just society, to heroic narratives of future success, but how sustainable is a politics based in hope, transcendence and self-assertion? How can energy, hope, curiosity and momentum withstand the inevitability of failure, as they confront intractable conflicts, historical or structurally entrenched injustices? How do we keep going? How do we remember that keeping going is worth doing?

## off

#### Text: The United Mexican States should offer reparations to the Bracero Justice Movement and the Bracero proa alliance of Mexico.

#### Their author says MEXICO is withholding the reparations—this is what the Braceros actually want

Goodman and Rivera ’13 – 1AC author

Adam is a Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Pennsylvania. Verónica is a Ph.D. candidate in history at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), “Bracero Guestworkers, Unpaid”, Jacobin, http://jacobinmag.com/2013/10/bracero-guestworkers-unpaid/) LEA

Every Tuesday, 76-year-old Miguel **Díaz spends the better part of the day outside the House of Representatives** in Mexico City. Díaz went to the United States in 1960s as a bracero, a contracted guestworker. Upon returning to Mexico, he and millions of other braceros were never paid the 10 percent of their earnings that had been withheld and sent to the Mexican government in an attempt to ensure braceros’ temporary status. Each week, Díaz is joined outside the House of Representatives by around 100 other braceros, as well as widows and children of braceros. The vast majority are in their 70s or 80s. Some live in Mexico City, but others travel hours from other states to get there. Wearing sombreros to protect themselves from the sun, the braceros hang a large banner on the fence in front of the House that reads, “EPN [Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto] Pay Us or Kill Us!” According to their organization, the Binational Bracero Proa Alliance, an average of 14 braceros die each day. Their cause is urgent. The braceros’ struggle to recoup decades-old back pay sheds light on the unjust treatment and unexpected consequences of guestworker programs. On September 29, 1942, 71 years ago last month, the first braceros were contracted in Mexico City to work in the fields of Stockton, California. The Bracero Program, the largest and best-known guestworker program in U.S. history, brought 4.5 million Mexican laborers to the U.S. between 1942 and 1964. The program emerged in part due to wartime labor organizing among American farmworkers and economic need in Mexico. “I went to work [in the U.S.] in order to eat,” said 84-year-old Ezequiel Osorio. Like subsequent guestworker programs, the Bracero Program was designed by the U.S. and Mexico to create a steady, regulated flow of male laborers. Braceros labored mainly in agriculture, but some were hired to work on railroads. While some braceros financially benefitted from working in the US, they did so at a cost. The U.S. and Mexican governments subjected them to physical scrutiny and humiliation. When crossing the border, immigration officials forced them to strip and fumigated their naked bodies from head to toe with DDT, a dangerous insecticide. Those who cleared the medical and immigration screenings worked long hours doing strenuous labor, often living in poor, cramped conditions on the employer’s property. Those who faced abuses could not quit without facing deportation. Despite all of this, many braceros simply want the money they are due – the 10 percent of their earnings the Mexican government never paid them.

## Responsibility (contention 3)

#### No impact to biopower—

#### They misread modern biopolitics

**Ojakangus ‘5** (Mika, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power” <http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf>)

In fact, the history of modern Western societies would be quite incomprehensible without taking into account that there exists a form o power which refrains from killing but which nevertheless is capable of directing people’s lives. The effectiveness of bio‐power can be seen lying precisely in that it refrains and withdraws before every demand of killing, even though these demands would derive from the demand of justice. In bio‐political societies, according to Foucault, capital punishment could not be maintained except by invoking less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the criminal: “One had the right to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others.”112 However, given that the “right to kill” is precisely a sovereign right, it can be argued that the bio‐political societies analyzed by Foucault were not entirely bio‐political. Perhaps, there neither has been nor can be a society that is entirely bio‐political. Nevertheless, the fact is that present‐day European societies have abolished capital punishment. In them, there are no longer exceptions. It is the very “right to kill” that has been called into question. However, it is not called into question because of enlightened moral sentiments, but rather because of the deployment of bio‐political thinking and practice. For all these reasons, Agamben’s thesis, according to which the concentration camp is the fundamental bio‐political paradigm of the West, has to be corrected.113 The bio‐political paradigm of the West is not the concentration camp, but, rather, the present‐day welfare society and, instead of homo sacer, the paradigmatic figure of the bio‐political society can be seen, for example, in the middle‐class Swedish social‐democrat. Although this figure is an object – and a product – of the huge bio‐political machinery, it does not mean that he is permitted to kill without committing homicide. Actually, the fact that he eventually dies, seems to be his greatest “crime” against the machinery. (In bio‐political societies, death is not only “something to be hidden away,” but, also, as Foucault stresses, the most “shameful thing of all”.114) Therefore, he is not exposed to an unconditional threat of death, but rather to an unconditional retreat of all dying. In fact, the bio‐political machinery does not want to threaten him, but to encourage him, with all its material and spiritual capacities, to live healthily, to live long and to live happily – even when, in biological terms, he “should have been dead long ago”.115 This is because bio‐power is not bloody power over bare life for its own sake but pure power over all life for the sake of the living. It is not power but the living, the condition of all life – individual as well as collective – that is the measure of the success of bio‐power.

#### Self-correcting

**Campbell, 98** (Professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle - 1998 (David, “Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,” pg. 204-205)

The political possibilities enabled by this permanent provocation of power and freedom can be specified in more detail by thinking in terms of the predominance of the “bio-power” discussed above. In this sense, because the governmental practices of biopolitics in West­ern nations have been increasingly directed toward modes of being and forms of life — such that sexual conduct has become an object of concern, individual health has been figured as a domain of discipline, and the family has been transformed into an instrument of govern­ment— the ongoing agonism between those practices and the free­dom they seek to contain means that individuals have articulated a series of counterdemands drawn from those new fields of concern. For example, as the state continues to prosecute people according to sexual orientation, human rights activists have proclaimed the right of gays to enter into formal marriages, adopt children, and receive the same health and insurance benefits granted to their straight coun­terparts. These claims are a consequence of the permanent provoca­tion of power and freedom in biopolitics, and stand as testament to the “strategic reversibility” of power relations: if the terms of governmental practices can be made into focal points for resistances, then the “history of government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ is interwoven with the history of dissenting ‘counterconducts.”’39 Indeed, the emer­gence of the state as the major articulation of “the political” has in­volved an unceasing agonism between those in office and those they rule. State intervention in everyday life has long incited popular col­lective action, the result of which has been both resistance to the state and new claims upon the state. In particular, “the core of what we now call ‘citizenship’ consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war.” In more recent times, constituencies associated with women’s, youth, ecological, and peace movements (among others) have also issued claims on society. These resistances are evidence that the break with the discursive/nondiscursive dichotomy central to the logic of interpretation undergirding this analysis is (to put it in conventional terms) not only theoretically licensed; **it is empirically warranted.** Indeed, expanding the interpretive imagination so as to enlarge the categories through which we understand the constitution of “the political” has been a necessary precondition for making sense of Foreign Policy’s concern for the ethical borders of identity in America. Accordingly, there are manifest political implications that flow from theorizing identity. As Judith Butler concluded: “The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated.”

#### Biopower is good—

#### Critical to the global economy

**Clough ‘4**(Patricia, Professor of Sociology at City University for NY, “Technoscience, Global Politics, and Cultural Criticism” Project Muse, AM)

Control is a deployment of biopower dispersed over networks of information and communication, where the targets of control are not subjects or their behavioral expression of internalized social norms; rather, control is aimed at populations, a never-ending modulation of moods, capacities, affects, potentialities statistically assembled in genetic codes, identification numbers, ratings profiles, preference listings, risk statuses, that is, bodies of data and information (including human bodies as data and information). Control works at the subindividual, molecular level of bodies and not necessarily, or only, human bodies. Control therefore points to the increasing abandonment of support for socialization and education of the individual subject through interpellation to and through national and familial ideological apparatuses. The production of normalization is not only, or even primarily, a matter of socializing the subject; increasingly, it is a matter of directly bringing bodies and bodily affective capacities under an expanded grid of control, especially through the marketization of affective capacity. As such, control accompanies the subsumption of affective capacity, or life itself, into capital. That is, the subsumption of labor into capital is now transforming the Fordist-Keynesian regime of accumulation, when the laborers’ social reproduction had itself become a force of production and where laborers’ demands for higher wages, shorter hours, increased job security, and a raised standard of living for themselves and their families had been met with technological development and the expansion of consumer markets for the demanded products and services. With the transformation of the Fordist-Keynesian regime, in what has been called postmodern or global capitalism, there is ongoing investment in technologies, including biotechnologies, and a deepening of the commodification of human services through their biomedicalization. This is not only the case of the political economies of the first world; the biopolitics of an affect economy is felt globally with profound effects. Accordingly, capitalist accumulation has shifted to the domain of affective, subindividual bodily capacities (body parts, functions, and powers). There is a collectivization or socialization of affectivity, so that affect, as Brian Massumi (a symposium participant) puts it, must be thought of as “an impersonal flow before it is a subjective content.”32 The collectivization of affectivity allows for the realization of value in the modulation of affect, in the realization of the multiple force of time on bodies, that is, in the affective switching of bodies from one mode to another in terms of attention, arousal, interest, receptivity, stimulation, attentiveness, action, reaction, and inaction. In an affect economy, value is not only a matter of consuming products; rather, value is sought in the expansion or contraction of affective capacity. Therefore, affect is “beyond measure.” It not only is beyond the measure of the consumption of use value in the production of surplus value; affect is beyond measure because it is power or potential that cannot be limited. It faces obstacles, not limits.33 While beyond measure, affect is susceptible, however, to biopolitical control, or what Massumi refers to as the “powering-up—or the powering-away—of potential,” such that the effort to capture the intensity of each, often short-lived, outburst of resistance in the struggle over the **biopolitical control is the very stuff of economic productivity** in the becoming of a worldwide or global political economy of affect.34

#### **Economic collapse causes nuclear war and accesses multiple external impacts**

**Harris and Burrows ‘9** **(**Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>, AM)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an **unintended escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to **escalating** **crises**. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

#### ****Protectionism unleashes multiple scenarios for global nuclear war********Panzner ‘9**** (Michael Panzner, Prof. at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, 2009, p. 136-138, AM)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster, But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange, foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the (heap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United States and China is "inevitable" at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

#### Economic crisis stops human development – increases poverty

Ban Ki-Moon, secretary general of the United Nations, 4/2/’9

(<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/02/g20-recession-ban-ki-moon>)

Today's G20 meeting can make the difference between human hope and despair, between economic recovery and a plunge into deepening recession. We have seen the frightening velocity of change. What began as a financial crisis has become a global economic crisis. I fear worse to come: a full-blown political crisis defined by growing social unrest, weakened governments and angry publics who have lost all faith in their leaders and their own future.

We must stop the slide. The recession hurts everyone, but those hurt worst are the poor - people with no homes or savings to lose, who in some countries spend as much as 80% of their income on food, and often lack the basics of healthcare, water and sanitation. They are the majority of the world's people - and they have no safety net.

In good times, economic and social development comes slowly. In bad times, things fall apart alarmingly fast. It is a short step from hunger to starvation, from disease to death, from peace and stability to conflict and wars that spill across borders and affect us all, near and far. Unless we can build a worldwide recovery we face a looming catastrophe in human development.

## Contention 4

**Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality**

Cummiskey 90– Professor of Philosophy, Bates David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical considerat

ion to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### Ethical policymaking requires calculation of consequences

Gvosdev 5 – Rhodes scholar, PhD from St. Antony’s College, executive editor of The National Interest; Nikolas, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, pmuse,

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

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### OV

#### 1) the us government

**Kane, 8 –** US Marine Corps Major, thesis SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES for the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting (Brian, “Comprehensive Engagement: A Winning Strategy “ <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504901>) **NSS = National Security Strategy**

Engagement strategies are not new. Since the end of the Cold War, engagement strategy has been called “comprehensive containment, conditional containment, conditional engagement, limited engagement, quid pro quo engagement, congagement, unconditional engagement, and comprehensive engagement.”8 As a result, engagement strategy represents a “conceptual fog” in today’s environment.9

 However, the Clinton Administration attempted to dissipate this fog with the first post-Cold War, multi-faceted definition proposed in its NSS, which stated that engagement strategy is:

(1) a broad based grand strategic orientation;

 (2) a specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state through the

 unconditional provision of continuous concessions to that state;

 (3) a bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to a state;

 (4) a bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of mutual interest

 with a target state; and

 (5) a bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to facilitate

 economic and political liberalization in a target state.10

This definition of engagement has been the most successful historically.11

#### 2) academics & professors

**Takamine, 6 -** assistant Professor of Politics in the Department of Integrated Arts and Science at Okinawa National College of Technology(Tsukasa, Japan's Development Aid to China: The Long-Running Foreign Policy of Engagement, p. 18)

The various policy objectives pursued by Japan’s China ODA described above illustrate the striking flexibility of Japanese ODA as a foreign policy instrument. Nevertheless, certain key underlying concepts have remained consistent since I979, notably the concept of engagement. In this book, the term engagement means a relationship of sustained interaction over a long period, intended by a state in order to promote positive relations with another state. In turn, such interaction is expected to promote or increase the national interests of the state which initiated it. A policy of engagement is potentially composed of a number of different dimensions, for example, political, economic, military and cultural. Engagement further implies a dynamic interaction and, of course, is a two-way relationship. Japan's engagement policy with China, addressed in this book, essentially consists of Japan`s attempt to interact with China politically and economically, with military and cultural considerations less prominent. As Reinhard Drifte points out, sustained economic and political interaction with China are expected to 'steer China towards a peaceful and sustainable path…while simultaneously hedging against any Chinese strategic breakout or policy failure’. This book will also demonstrate, however, that engaging China is also expected to serve Japan`s own economic and political interests. Of course, in this case as in others, engagement is a two-way street, and Chinese perceptions of Japan’s policy of engagement must be expected to differ from Japan’s. Such considerations, however, are beyond the scope of this research.

## CP

### OV

#### It was transferred to Mexico

Pitti ‘5

Stephen, Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Gilder Lehrman Center International Conference at¶ Yale University “repairing the past: confronting the legacies of slavery, genocide and caste”, October 27-29, 2005, Yale University, http://www.yale.edu/glc/justice/thompson.pdf

Braceros would, it was hoped, modernize Mexico with new money and new plans for “mañana.” The financial map would look like this: Beginning in World War II, ten percent of each paycheck was to be sent to the regional office of the War Manpower Service. U.S. officials would then transfer it to Mexican governmental accounts at the Wells Fargo Bank in San Francisco. Mexican officials would subsequently issue credits to two of its domestic financial institutions -- Banco Agrícola and Banco Nacional de Ahorra -- which were meant to distribute the funds to braceros upon their return to Mexico. A great deal of cash was at stake, despite the low wages paid contract workers. Scholars today estimate that between $10 million and $100 million dollars was removed from bracero paychecks and held in reserve.

#### Comparatively solves the aff better

Pitti ‘5

Stephen, Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Gilder Lehrman Center International Conference at¶ Yale University “repairing the past: confronting the legacies of slavery, genocide and caste”, October 27-29, 2005, Yale University, http://www.yale.edu/glc/justice/thompson.pdf

Seeking influence in central Mexico as well as among mexicanos living abroad, members of the PRD (the Revolutionary Democratic Party) introduced a redress bill to the Mexican Congress in 1999. By mid-2001, members of the PRD would travel to California to meet with BJM activists, and Congressman Sergio Acosta would lead a national investigation into the bracero issue.6 Mexican legislator Alfonso Nava told braceros gathered in Fresno last summer that “Your blood helped to build this country, and you left your wives and your children at home to help stem economic crisis in Mexico. But the only thing we’ve done is extort when you come back home. Now it’s our turn to give back.”7 As Mexican officials traveled to address braceros in the United States, former braceros still living in their home country directed significant animus towards the United States government, rallying with great frequency at the U.S. consulates in Monterey and elsewhere, but **they more often skewered Mexican elected officials for failing to promote the values of the Mexican Revolution, and for compromising the provisions of Mexican national citizenship**. Most BJM energy in Mexico thus focused on the apparent corruption of Mexican officials who stole bracero wages in past decades. By November 2004, the movement of ex-braceros had gathered signatures of solidarity from 100,000 Mexican supporters, including journalists, academics, and labor unionists. Buoyed by this attention, Gutiérrez continued to travel widely, enrolling some 20,000 former braceros into his new organization within the first year, and local groups emerged in both countries to gather bracero names on behalf of the BJM cause.8

#### the money was transferred to Mexico!

Pitti ‘5

Stephen, Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Gilder Lehrman Center International Conference at¶ Yale University “repairing the past: confronting the legacies of slavery, genocide and caste”, October 27-29, 2005, Yale University, http://www.yale.edu/glc/justice/thompson.pdf

In late-1999 Yvette Cabrera of the Orange County Register convinced archivists at Wells Fargo to release documents related to the Program that showed that the bank had in fact transferred bracero funds to the Banco Nacional de Mexico in 1944 and 1945. That evidence provided Mexican workers a new weapon in their dealings with the Mexican government and with Banrural, and in November 1999 that financial institution agreed to review paperwork submitted by former braceros with details of past wage deductions. The burden of proof remained on the braceros, of course, as Banrural officials claimed not to have found any evidence in its own archives confirming that the savings accounts had gone unpaid.3 This burden of proof became one of the true sticking points for bracero justice activists who knew that many workers had long ago lost the micas (identification cards) and wage sheets given to each contracted laborer in decades past. Organizers instead pursued a different strategy for repayment, calling Banrural’s efforts “a sly trick to halt any collective demands.”4

#### The status quo solves their US key warrants—court cases will inevitably cause reparations—MEXICO is the only hold out.

Pitti ‘5

Stephen, Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Gilder Lehrman Center International Conference at¶ Yale University “repairing the past: confronting the legacies of slavery, genocide and caste”, October 27-29, 2005, Yale University, http://www.yale.edu/glc/justice/thompson.pdf

In part the movement for bracero justice in both countries was thus aimed at combatting the perceived sale of low-wage Mexican labor to U.S. employers, the very essence of past and present contract labor programs, according to many critics. But as they pursued this line of action in the press, and with elected officials, Gutiérrez, Medina, and others involved in the campaign also began to develop a litigation strategy for the U.S. courts. Movement architects seem from the start to have avoided any serious engagement with the Mexican civil courts, perhaps in part because those institutions were deemed cumbersome and likely unwilling to handle a suit against the Mexican government. More importantly, Gutiérrez and others knew that the United States legal system did offer a **promising forum for hearing the workers’ case**, as recent Holocaust cases had made clear the system’s capacity for bringing foreign governments to U.S. court. Many braceros were U.S. citizens, furthermore, and all contracted workers had labored under contracts signed by United States officials. Not a bad case, many attorneys believed.

### AT: DA

If we win our CP solves, it access all of their moral framework. That means you default to cost-benefit analysis—even prominent deontologists concede this

Finnis ‘80

John Finnis, deontologist, teaches jurisprudence and constitutional Law. He has been Professor of Law & Legal Philosophy since 1989,1980, Natural Law and Natural Rights, pg. 111-2

The sixth requirement has obvious connections with the fifth, but introduces a new range of problems for practical reason, problems which go to the heart of ‘morality’. For this is the requirement that one bring about good in the world (in one’s own life and the lives of others) by actions that are efficient for their (reasonable) purpose (s). One must not waste one’s opportunities by using inefficient methods. One’s actions should be judged by their effectiveness, by their fitness for their purpose, by their utility, their consequences… There is a wide range of contexts in which it is possible and only reasonable to calculate, measure, compare, weigh, and assess the consequences of alternative decisions. Where a choice must be made it is reasonable to prefer human good to the good of animals. Where a choice must be made it is reasonable to prefer basic human goods (such as life) to merely instru­mental goods (such as property). Where damage is inevitable, it is reasonable to prefer stunning to wounding, wounding to maiming, maiming to death: i.e. lesser rather than greater damage to one-and-the-same basic good in one-and-the-same instantiation. Where one way of participating in a human good includes both all the good aspects and effects of its alternative, and more, it is reasonable to prefer that way: a remedy that both relieves pain and heals is to be preferred to the one that merely relieves pain. Where a person or a society has created a personal or social hierarchy of practical norms and orienta­tions, through reasonable choice of commitments, one can in many cases reasonably measure the benefits and disadvantages of alternatives. (Consider a man who ha decided to become a scholar, or a society that has decided to go to war.) Where one ~is considering objects or activities in which there is reasonably a market, the market provides a common de­nominator (currency) and enables a comparison to be made of prices, costs, and profits. Where there are alternative techniques or facilities for achieving definite, objectives, cost— benefit analysis will make possible a certain range of reasonable comparisons between techniques or facilities. Over a wide range of preferences and wants, it is reasonable for an individual or society to seek o maximize the satisfaction of those preferences or wants.

### AT: Misread Aff

#### The aff is a misreading of history—the MEXICAN GOVERNMENT owes reparations, not the US

Pitti ‘5

Stephen, Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Gilder Lehrman Center International Conference at¶ Yale University “repairing the past: confronting the legacies of slavery, genocide and caste”, October 27-29, 2005, Yale University, http://www.yale.edu/glc/justice/thompson.pdf

Many contracted workers thus expressed great hope that they’d find a pot of gold on their return to the patria, **but most never found their money**. (Due in part to high rates of illiteracy among U.S.-bound campesinos, it seems also that many did not know about this provision in their written contracts. The fact that neither government agents nor agribusiness employers made this crystal clear would later enrage braceros and their families.) Those who inquired about their savings accounts during World War II most often had no access to that money upon their return to Mexico. Mexican government officials seem commonly to have told returning braceros that they needed to travel to Mexico City to access those funds. Of course many could not afford the trip, but those who made the effort were often told that their money was not yet ready... or that it had been lost or redirected. **Recent research suggests that perhaps only 2% of braceros ever received their mandatory savings.** Archival digging has also found evidence that contract Mexicans complained actively about this pattern of fraud, and that more than one tried to discover where the money had gone. (He was told that the cash might have been redirected to state agencies to purchase agricultural equipment and fund irrigation projects in rural Mexico.)

## Contention 3

### Biopower Good

#### Growth solves poverty

Vasquez, director of the Cato Institute’s Project on Global Economic Liberty, ‘1(Jan, “Ending Mass Poverty, September, <http://www.cato.org/research/articles/vas-0109.html>)

The historical record is clear: the single, most effective way to reduce world poverty is economic growth. Western countries began discovering this around 1820 when they broke with the historical norm of low growth and initiated an era of dramatic advances in material well-being. Living standards tripled in Europe and quadrupled in the United States in that century, improving at an even faster pace in the next 100 years. Economic growth thus eliminated mass poverty in what is today considered the developed world. Taking the long view, growth has also reduced poverty in other parts of the world: in 1820, about 75 percent of humanity lived on less than a dollar per day; today about 20 percent live under that amount. Even a short-term view confirms that the recent acceleration of growth in many developing countries has reduced poverty, measured the same way. In the past 10 years, the percentage of poor people in the developing world fell from 29 to 24 percent. Despite that progress, however, the number of poor people has remained stubbornly high at around 1,200 million. And geographically, reductions in poverty have been uneven.

#### Economic downturn kills democracy

Rachman, Financial Times Chief Foreign Affairs columnist, January ‘9

(Gideon, Washington Quarterly, “Democracy: The Case for Opportunistic Idealism,” p. 119)

By contrast Cambodia, a much poorer country with much weaker democratic traditions, has been unable to sustain a transition to democracy. Despite a massive UN-sponsored effort to bring peace and free elections to the country in 1993, the country has essentially reverted to a one-party autocracy. In the past couple of years, democracies have also been rolled back in other relatively poor countries such as Bangladesh and Nigeria. The violence and instability surrounding the Kenyan and Pakistani elections has only underlined the difficulties of holding democratic votes in relatively poor countries with deep ethnic and tribal divisions. Bush resolutely refused to acknowledge all these setbacks. Speaking in the United Arab Emirates on January 13, 2008, he hailed a "great new era" of "the advance of freedom." "My friends," he proclaimed to the assembled sheikhs, "a future of liberty stands before you." 7 Then Bush flew onto Egypt and lavished praise on Mubarak, who had thrown the last man who ran against him for the presidency into jail. As Bush traipsed around the Arab world, Freedom House, which monitors political and civil liberties around the world, issued its annual report, lamenting that "2007 was marked by a notable setback for global freedom." 8 The group pointed to setbacks across the world from South Asia to the Middle East and the former Soviet Union.

#### Recession rolls back democracies

Green and Schrage, 9 (Michael J Green is Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Associate Professor at Georgetown University, Steven P Schrage is the CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business and a former senior official with the US Trade Representative's Office, State Department and Ways & Means Committee, March 26, “It’s Not Just the Economy, Asia Times, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian_Economy/KC26Dk01.html>)

Challenges to the democratic model The trend in East Asia has been for developing economies to steadily embrace democracy and the rule of law in order to sustain their national success. But to thrive, new democracies also have to deliver basic economic growth. The economic crisis has hit democracies hard, with Japanese Prime Minister Aso Taro's approval collapsing to single digits in the polls and South Korea's Lee Myung-bak and Taiwan's Ma Ying Jeou doing only a little better (and the collapse in Taiwan's exports - particularly to China - is sure to undermine Ma's argument that a more accommodating stance toward Beijing will bring economic benefits to Taiwan). Thailand's new coalition government has an uncertain future after two years of post-coup drift and now economic crisis. The string of old and new democracies in East Asia has helped to anchor US relations with China and to maintain what former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice once called a "balance of power that favors freedom". A reversal of the democratic expansion of the past two decades would not only impact the global balance of power but also increase the potential number of failed states, with all the attendant risk they bring from harboring terrorists to incubating pandemic diseases and trafficking in persons. It would also undermine the demonstration effect of liberal norms we are urging China to embrace at home.

#### Extinction

Diamond, 95 – professor, lecturer, adviser, and author on foreign policy, foreign aid, and democracy

(Larry, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and instruments, issues and imperatives : a report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict”, December 1995, <http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/di.htm>)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.

**Growth solves warming**

**Tamazian ‘9** (Artur, Department of Financial Economics and Accounting, University of Santiago de Compostela “Does higher economic and financial development lead to environmental degradation: Evidence from BRIC countries”, Volume 37, Issue 1, January, Science Direct)

We show that the economic development decreases the environmental degradation with higher levels of economic growth. This finding confirms empirically the EKC existence for the countries under consideration. In addition, while the majority of the existing research is focused on consequences of economic growth on environmental degradation, we show that financial development might play a determinant role for environmental disclosure in developing economies. Our findings show that financial development is associated with decline in CO2 per capita emissions. Particularly, we find that capital market and banking sector development along with higher levels of FDI help to achieve lower CO2 per capita emissions. In this sense, it is noteworthy that the government can help the markets by establishing a strong policy framework that creates long-term value for greenhouse gas emissions reductions and consistently supports the development of new technologies that lead to a less carbon-intensive economy. Moreover, well-developed capital markets are very important; because firms can reduce the liquidity risk and can mobilize the funds required which is extremely useful in developing technology in the long run. Our overall results suggest some important policy recommendations. We believe that policies directed to financial openness and liberalization to attract higher levels of R&D-related foreign direct investment can decrease the environmental degradation. Our results supports the findings of Copeland and Taylor (2004) who claims that it would be unwise for countries to use trade protection as a means to improve their environment. This is important because the higher degree of economic and financial openness strengthen the institutional framework creating incentives for the firms to act upon. Therefore, addressing these issues might lead to higher energy efficiencies through technological advances as suggested by Blanford (2008) and possibly reduce the CO2 emissions in BRIC countries. Finally, we recognize that the technological change, R&D investment, environmental degradation and growth are not simply related. While our results pretend to be only an empirical evidence, it is worth noting that we were handicapped to capture the effects of R&D because we did not have the aggregate private sector; public sector and foreign firm level data on R&D spending and their investments in development of technologies. Yet, it is beyond the scope of this study to find exact mechanism through which financial system development leading to technological development through technological choice of the firms. Here, we would like to highlight that in the last two decades there has emerged a large macro-economic literature that builds on the above concepts to produce models of overall economic growth based on technological change (Romer, 1994; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Solow, 2000). Our argument with respect to financial development and environment degradation is that higher degree of financial system development and openness prop up technological innovations by increasing spending on energy conservation R&D which results in energy efficiency and hence it may lower emissions.

**Extinction**

**NYET ‘6** (Non-partisan, non-religious, non-ideological, free news filter, The Extinction Scale - October 16)

We rate Global Climate Change as a greater threat for human extinction in this century. Most scientists forecast disruptions and dislocations, if current trends persist. The extinction danger is more likely if we alter an environmental process that causes harmful effects and leads to conditions that make the planet uninhabitable to humans. Considering that there is so much that is unknown about global systems, we consider climate change to be the greatest danger to human extinction. However, there is no evidence of imminent danger. Nuclear war at some point in this century might happen. It is unlikely to cause human extinction though. While several countries have nuclear weapons, there are few with the firepower to annihilate the world. For those nations it would be suicidal to exercise that option. The pattern is that the more destructive technology a nation has, the more it tends towards rational behavior. Sophisticated precision weapons then become better tactical options. The bigger danger comes from nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists with the help of a rogue state, such as North Korea. The size of such an explosion would not be sufficient to threaten humanity as a whole. Instead it could trigger a major war or even world war. Under this scenario human extinction would only be possible if other threats were present, such as disease and climate change. We monitor war separately. However we also need to incorporate the dangers here.

# 1NR

## PTX

See Octos and stuff